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The Erosion of Civil Rights Remedies: How Ashcroft v. al-Kidd Altered 
Qualified Immunity 
By Madeleine Sharp 
Introduction 
The United States justice system was designed to ensure that there is equal access under the 
law. Such a system is truly legitimate only if the government can be held accountable in court. In 
that vein, the Bivens cause of action was created to protect the people and to contain government 
overreach by allowing the public to sue under the Constitution.   
The qualified immunity doctrine was designed as a counterweight to Bivens. It is a 
reasonable enough principle, created to prevent government officials from being incessantly sued 
over areas of law with which they might be unaware. However, recent developments with the 
qualified immunity doctrine have transformed the counterweight into a blockade. Qualified 
immunity since the 2011 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd decision essentially guarantees that no plaintiff will 
ever succeed in a suit against the government.  
Part I of this Article reviews the origins of Bivens suits and the roots of qualified immunity in 
English common law. Additionally, Part I also discusses the Supreme Court’s reasoning as to 
why qualified immunity is a necessary component of the American legal system. Part II outlines 
how qualified immunity was analyzed before al-Kidd. Part III surveys the various critiques of 
qualified immunity to illuminate the controversy that surrounds the doctrine. Part IV explores al-
Kidd and highlights the changes it brought to the qualified immunity doctrine. Finally, Part V 
delves into three post-al-Kidd cases and argues how these decisions reflect the adverse changes 
in the application of qualified immunity. Ultimately, this Article contends that these changes 
degrade the reputation of the Supreme Court, rendering it particularly unable to satisfactorily rule 
on issues associated with the Black Lives Matter movement.  
 
I. The Origins of Bivens and Qualified Immunity 
 
The principle that individuals should be able to seek redress for violations of their 
constitutional rights is a thoroughly American one, appearing in one of the nation’s earliest 
cases, Marbury v. Madison: “[i]t is a settled and invariable principle, that every right, when 
withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”1  
This is the idea that inspired the creation of Bivens suits. Bivens suits emerged from the 1971 
Supreme Court case, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 
In that case, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment guarantees a remedy of money damages 
against federal government officials.2 The Court emphasized that “where federally protected 
rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to 
                                                 
* Madeleine Sharp, J.D., University of California, Irvine School of Law (2016); University of California, Irvine 
Public Interest Law Fellow at California Women’s Law Center (2016). 
1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803). 
2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971). 
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adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.”3 Despite the fact that the Fourth 
Amendment did not explicitly provide for this remedy, the majority concluded that federal courts 
may use any available remedy to “make good the wrong done.”4 In Supreme Court cases since 
1971, plaintiffs have been permitted to seek Bivens remedies under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment5 as well as under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.6 In addition, the Court has previously assumed without deciding that Bivens 
extends to First Amendment violations.7  
Qualified immunity has equally deep roots. A public official's immunity from suit first 
appeared as a principle in English common law. The King originally held absolute immunity 
because English society widely accepted that a citizen could not bring an action against the 
crown in a court licensed by the King.8 Absolute immunity for English judges was similarly a 
feature of English common law.9 Furthermore, the English Bill of Rights of 1689 granted 
members of Parliament absolute immunity from criminal or civil action related to their official 
duties.10 These roots were to inspired America's Founding Fathers.  
Absolute immunity has traditionally only been extended to select classes of government 
officials. Those given total immunity include judges acting in their judicial role.11 The Court 
recognized that it was “a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration 
of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act 
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”12  
Prosecutors are also given absolute immunity for their prosecutorial tasks, as “[t]he public trust 
of the prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the 
consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages.”13  
Additionally, legislators are given the protection of absolute immunity for their legislative 
tasks. Legislators are immune from “deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative 
duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good.”14 Thus, immunity is considered 
necessary to protect legislators from the cost and inconvenience of a trial.15 Lastly, absolute 
immunity is available to the President16 as well as to law enforcement officers acting as 
witnesses in court.17  
In essence, qualified immunity is given to all other government officials. This applies when a 
state or local official faces individual liability for a constitutional tort in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
                                                 
3 Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).  
4 Id. at 396 (quoting Bell, 327 U.S., at 684).   
5 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
6 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).   
7 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). 
8 Kelson Bohnet, Incomplete Approach, Incorrect Outcome: Qualified Immunity, Viewpoint Discrimination, and the 
Troubling Implications of Weise v. Casper, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 401, 402 (2011). 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57, 360 (1978). 
12 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871). 
13 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1976). 
14 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). 
15 Id. 
16 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982). 
17 Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1506 (2012). 
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action, or when a federal official faces individual liability for a constitutional tort through a 
Bivens action.18  
In articulating the need for qualified immunity, the Supreme Court does not fully discuss the 
risks of having such a doctrine, such as the fear of a government that operates carte blanche, with 
officers recklessly infringing on the rights of citizens. Instead, the qualified immunity doctrine is 
described as necessary to protect those faced with important decisions. The Court has argued that 
it would be unjust to subject government officials to liability without evidence of bad faith, 
particularly since the officer “is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise 
discretion.”19 The Court has also stated that it is unfair to expect too much of officials when it 
comes to keeping track of what is or is not legal: “[t]hese officials are subject to a plethora of 
rules, ‘often so voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in such flux that officials can 
only comply with or enforce them selectively.’”20  
The Supreme Court also emphasizes the importance of preventing government officials from 
hesitating when exercising their discretion. Where an official's duties legitimately require action 
in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by 
action taken “with independence and without fear of consequences.”21  
The Supreme Court even appears to find civil rights suits a threat to society. Such social 
costs include the fact that claims are frequently run against the innocent, the expenses of 
litigation, diversion and distraction from the government’s important public duties, the risk of 
deterring people from serving public office, and “the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen 
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the 
unflinching discharge of their duties.’”22 Thus, qualified immunity was designed to make the 
courts efficient and protect officials, not to make suing the government more accessible to the 
people. In fact, the Supreme Court sees qualified immunity as a shield that actually protects the 
public. 
 
II. Qualified Immunity Before al-Kidd 
 
The qualified immunity doctrine pre-al-Kidd generally shielded government officials from 
liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”23 This test requires a 
close analysis of two questions: 1) whether there was a “constitutional violation”24 and 2) 
whether the right at issue was “clearly established.”25  
 
A. Constitutional Violation Prong 
 
Typically courts are discouraged from examining the first question as to constitutionality if 
there is no need to. This is partly because of the judicial policy of avoidance of constitutional 
                                                 
18 Bohnet, supra note 8, at 403.  
19 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974). 
20 Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 (1984) (citations omitted). 
21 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). 
22 Harlow, 457 U.S. 800, 814. 
23 Id. at 818. 
24 Id. at 815. 
25 Id. at 818. 
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questions unless adjudication is considered absolutely necessary.26 The first question is also not 
examined due to the courts’ desire to conserve government resources on these types of cases: 
“[i]f the law at that time did not clearly establish that the officer's conduct would violate the 
Constitution, the officer should not be subject to liability or …even the burdens of litigation.”27 
The Supreme Court has also made clear that engaging in an analysis of the first question is “an 
essentially academic exercise” which can overwhelm courts with heavy caseloads and result “in 
substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have no effect on 
the outcome of the case.”28 This disdain of discussing whether there was a constitutional 
violation has led to an overly close examination of the second question in the analysis.  
 
B. Clearly Established Right Prong 
 
The “clearly established right” prong was clarified in several decisions and has remained 
relatively unchanged since 1971.29 In determining whether a right at issue was clearly 
established, the “contours” of the right must be “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”30 The exact action in question need 
not be unlawful, however, in “light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”31 
Because of the subjective nature of the analysis, determining whether a right was “clearly 
established” is the subject of some confusion. For instance, some Supreme Court cases have 
found that a “clearly established right” existed despite the absence of cases explicitly stating so.32 
There are also cases in which the Court found that no “clearly established right” existed because 
there was no precedent directly on point as to that issue.33   
Thus, the state of the doctrine before al-Kidd was to avoid constitutional issues and instead 
focus on the “clearly established” prong. While the “clearly established” prong could be 
interpreted favorably to the plaintiff by finding that the right violated was clearly established by 
law despite no precedent directly on point, it was more often found that the right violated was not 
clearly established by law because there was not enough supporting precedent.  
 
III. Critiques of Qualified Immunity 
 
Even prior to the recent trend that has made qualified immunity an insurmountable obstacle 
for plaintiffs, the doctrine had been subject to criticism.  
One of the most troubling aspects of qualified immunity is that it pits vital interests against 
each other—the desire to accommodate immediate yet important decisions government officials 
make, against the need to oversee those who have tremendous power over others. This often 
results in an unwieldy balancing act, as a hands-off approach to police oversight “creates 
unbridled discretion, increased arbitrariness of action, and no remedial aid for those injured by 
                                                 
26 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241. 
27 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). 
28 Pearson, 555 U.S. 236-237. 
29 See, e.g., Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2067 (2014);  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); 
30 Anderson, 483 U.S. 640. 
31 Id.  
32 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997). 
33 See, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617-18 (1999). 
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inappropriate police work …. [y]et, too much regulation and scrutiny amount to fear of action, an 
unwillingness to serve, and undue exposure to personal liability.”34 Either way, law enforcement 
risks losing the trust and support of the public. 
There was also concern about how qualified immunity being manipulated by the courts. The 
Supreme Court has emphasized the need to preserve judicial resources by allowing courts to use 
the order of qualified immunity analysis that most quickly resolves the matter.35 Accordingly, 
courts are able to avoid the constitutional analysis entirely and instead focus on whether the 
legality of the action in question is “clearly established.”36 Thus, qualified immunity became “a 
policy-driven analysis which was largely uninfluenced by any controlling law,” allowing for the 
resolution of civil rights actions to be “almost entirely in the unfettered control of the courts.”37 
Because qualified immunity is largely based on judicial discretion, the application of the 
doctrine varies wildly across the country. In fact, the instability of its application has been so 
persistent and so pronounced that one expert describes qualified immunity as existing “in a 
perpetual state of crisis.”38  
Other criticisms go so far as to blame qualified immunity for preventing the development of 
civil rights law: “[t]he civil rights remedial scheme organized around qualified immunity thus 
has an inherently self-preserving or stabilizing quality [as] it allows for tinkering at the margins, 
but fundamental recasting of the terms of the debate is unlikely.”39 Specifically, qualified 
immunity is criticized as preventing certain types of civil rights claims, such as an equal 
protection claim, from being properly heard. In other words, “[t]he fact that some types of claims 
are destined to fail because of the type of claim they are, [and] not because of the particularized 
behavior of the defendant, is hidden.”40 When civil rights claims were heard, qualified immunity 
analysis before al-Kidd was also criticized for focusing too much on the reasonableness of the 
government rather than on the constitutional rights implicated: “[q]ualified immunity makes the 
essential issue of a civil rights claim the question of whether it would be too much of an inhibitor 
of government action to require a particular defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff.”41    
Even more troubling is that a rare success prevents an accurate understanding of qualified 
immunity, as “[a] few large recoveries in cases that present particularly compelling facts obscure 
the reality of the fruitlessness of most claims.”42 Hope v. Pelzer is an example of such a success 
story, while the large number of cases that fail go unnoticed. In the Hope case a prisoner was tied 
to a hitching post for seven hours with his shirt off, exposing him to the sun.43 While there, he 
was given one or two water breaks but no bathroom breaks, and a guard taunted him about his 
thirst.44 The Court denied the prison officials qualified immunity after concluding that there was 
no way the officials could provide an adequate explanation for their behavior.45 Because this 
case involved such a shocking abuse of power, it would have been difficult for the Court to 
                                                 
34 Jeffrey D. May, Determining The Reach of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Litigation: When is the Law 
“Clearly Established?,” 35 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 585 (2012).  
35 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-237 (2009). 
36 May, supra note 34, at 595. 
37 Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 664 MO. L. REV. 123, 126 (1999). 
38 John C. Jeffries, Jr, What’s Wrong With Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 852 (2010). 
39 Hassel, supra note 37 at 153. 
40 Id. at 155.  
41 Hassel, supra note 37 at 156. 
42 Id. 
43 Hope, supra note 32 at 734-735. 
44 Id. at 734.  
45 Id. at 746. 
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decide any other way. Since then, no cases have involved such egregious facts, and Hope appears 
to be an anomaly in a long line of decisions granting qualified immunity to government officials. 
With the emphasis on the defendant, no attention is given to the more important discussions of 
which civil rights should be protected or how the law should be enforced. 
 
IV.    Al-Kidd and How it Changed Qualified Immunity 
 
Aschcroft v. al-Kidd, decided in 2011, created an even more stringent standard for plaintiffs 
to meet. This new standard eventually came to prevail, appearing in the Supreme Court’s 
qualified immunity decisions from that point forward.  
Abdullah al-Kidd was a United States citizen who was detained in March 2003 as he checked 
in for a flight to Saudi Arabia.46 His detainment was one of many that occurred in the aftermath 
of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.47   
Then-Attorney General John Ashcroft authorized federal prosecutors and law enforcement 
officials to use the material witness statute48 to detain individuals with suspected ties to terrorist 
organizations,49 despite the fact that federal officials had no intention of calling most of these 
individuals as witnesses. Essentially, these individuals were detained because federal officials 
suspected them of supporting terrorism but lacked sufficient evidence to charge them with a 
crime.50 
Al-Kidd remained in federal custody for 16 days.51 Over those 16 days, he was confined in a 
high-security cell that was lit for 24 hours a day in Virginia, Oklahoma, and then Idaho, during 
which he was strip-searched on multiple occasions.52 Additionally, each time al-Kidd was 
transferred to a different facility, he was handcuffed and shackled about his wrists, legs, and 
waist.53 He was finally released on “house arrest” although his freedom was subject to numerous 
restrictions.54 By the time al-Kidd's confinement and supervision ended 15 months after his 
arrest, al-Kidd had been fired from his job as an employee of a government contractor and had 
separated from his wife.55 
Al-Kidd was never charged with any crime, nor was he ever used as a material witness. He 
sued Ashcroft, who contended that he was protected by qualified immunity and moved to 
dismiss the lawsuit.56 Rejecting Ashcroft’s argument, the federal court of appeals found it clearly 
established law that, to arrest and detain a person as a material witness, without a desire to then 
use the person as a witness, and without probable cause of a crime, violates the Fourth 
                                                 
46 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 734 (2011). 
47 Id.  
48 The statute authorizes judges to “order the arrest of [a] person” whose testimony “is material in a criminal 
proceeding . . . if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.” 18 
U. S. C. §3144.  
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 598 F.3d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010). 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731. 
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Amendment.57 The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that al-Kidd had no claim upon 
which he could recover.58  
The Court defined “clearly established law” in a novel way. The Court held that “a 
Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the 
challenged conduct, [t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable 
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”59 The Court further 
reasoned that while a case directly on point is not required, “existing precedent must have placed 
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”60   
Defining the right at issue very narrowly, the Court then applied a new test that pretext could 
render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to a material-witness warrant unconstitutional.61 
Unsurprisingly, existing precedent did not place this extremely specific issue beyond debate. The 
opinion went on to state that “qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to 
make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.”62 According to the Court, 
qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
law.”63 The Court concluded that Ashcroft deserved neither label and was therefore entitled to 
qualified immunity.64 
This opinion gave the government more protection under qualified immunity than had ever 
been articulated before. Now, “every reasonable official” needed to be in agreement that the 
conduct at issue was impermissible, existing law had to make the question of whether a 
constitutional violation occurred “beyond debate,”65 and the government was allowed to violate 
the law if the decision was deemed reasonable but mistaken. However, none of the judges 
acknowledged these new additions in the opinion or those thereafter. This new formulation 
would prove to be quite an obstacle for plaintiffs in cases following al-Kidd.   
 
V. Al-Kidd and its Impact on Subsequent Qualified Immunity Opinions 
 
Qualified immunity opinions issued by the Supreme Court since al-Kidd have included these 
changes to the doctrine.66 None of these cases mention the fact that the new language seemingly 
came out of nowhere. Without explanation, the stringent demands of al-Kidd have become law, 
allowing an array of constitutional violations to go unremedied.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 598 F.3d at 1135. 
58 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 744. 
59 Id. at 741. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 743. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 41 JUL HUM. RTS. 5, 6 (2015). 
66 See, e.g., Reichle v. Howards, 132 S.Ct. 2088 (2012); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S.Ct. 3 (2013); Carroll v. Carman, 135 
S.Ct. 348 (2014); City and County of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765 (2015); Lane v. Franks, 134 
S.Ct. 2369 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012 (2014); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015).  
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A. Police Shootings 
 
Plumhoff v. Rickard involved a suspect’s death during a high-speed chase.67 Initially, 
police officers pulled over a vehicle for a broken headlight.68 Because the driver appeared 
nervous and did not produce his driver’s license, an officer asked the driver to step out of the 
car.69 Instead, the driver sped away. The officers gave chase, reaching speeds of over 100 miles 
per hour.70 The chase ended with the car pinned between two police cruisers. The driver 
attempted to free his car from this position, which prompted one officer to fire three shots into 
the car.71 As the driver tried to speed away, two more officers fired another twelve shots.72 Both 
the driver and his passenger were killed.73 The Supreme Court unanimously decided in favor of 
the police.  
The Court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.74 The Court reasoned that 
it was beyond “serious dispute” that the driver’s conduct posed a “grave public safety risk,” and 
the police were justified in shooting at the car to stop it.75 The Court further stated that the 
number of shots fired into the car were not excessive, and that “the officers need not stop 
shooting until [a] threat has ended.”76 
Yet in its reasoning, the Court cited only one other case to support its contention that the 
officers were entitled to use deadly force. In that case, Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court 
supported a police decision to employ a “Precision Intervention Technique” maneuver to stop a 
high-speed car chase, which carried a serious risk of injury or death for the driver and his 
passengers.77  
However, this one case does not exactly support the Court’s argument that the force the 
officers used in Plumhoff was “reasonable” as required to refute excessive force claims.78 Scott 
involved a police car essentially bumping into the suspect’s car to stop it. The Scott Court 
supported the actions of the police even though their actions “posed a high likelihood of serious 
injury or death to [the] respondent—though not the near certainty of death posed by, say, 
shooting a fleeing felon in the back of the head.”79 In Plumhoff, the police fired multiple direct 
shots at a fleeing driver, which is quite a leap from employing a strategic maneuver that can be 
used to stop a car chase.   
The Plumhoff Court went on to say that even if there were a Fourth Amendment 
violation, the officers were protected by qualified immunity because the law did not clearly 
establish that the conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.80 To support this, the Court relied 
solely on Brosseau v. Haugen, which held that it was “not clearly established” that police who 
                                                 
67 Plumhoff, 134 S.Ct. at 2017.  
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 2018. 
74 Id. at 2021-2022. 
75 Id. at 2022. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 2021. 
78 Id. at 2020.  
79 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007). 
80 Plumhoff, 134 S.Ct. at 2024. 
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shot a fleeing vehicle had violated the Fourth Amendment.81 However,  the Brosseau case is not 
quite guiding precedent.  
Brosseau is distinguishable because it involved a situation with more obvious danger. 
Specifically, a felony no-bail warrant had been issued for the suspect’s arrest on drug and other 
offenses.82 The lone police officer attempting to prevent the suspect from fleeing believed the 
suspect was reaching for a weapon.83 Additionally, the suspect was also in the middle of a fight 
at the time he was approached by police.84 Therefore, there was more of a provocation to act in 
this case than in Plumhoff. A potentially armed felon fighting in public does not prevent the same 
provocation as someone whose only offense was driving with a headlight out. Further, in 
Brosseau an end to the chase was imperative for public safety, while in Plumhoff the risk to 
public safety was not as great. These important factual differences can mean the difference 
between constitutionally permissible government action and impermissible excessive force.    
Despite the lack of clear support for the assertions of law concerning the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court protected the police in Plumhoff. In doing so, the Court has established 
that “whenever there is a high-speed chase that officers perceive could injure others – and that 
would seem to be true of virtually all high-speed chases – the police can shoot at the vehicle and 
keep shooting until it stops.”85 The practical result of Plumhoff is a dangerously permissive 
environment where the police have carte blanche to shoot as many times as they wish at fleeing 
suspects.  
 
B. Police Invasions of Privacy 
 
Messerschmidt v. Millender involved a complaint against the police for violating the 
Fourth Amendment rights of a suspect with an overbroad search warrant.86 The suspect had been 
involved in several instances of domestic violence against his girlfriend.87 The victim told police 
that her boyfriend fired at her with a sawed-off shotgun and told her that he would kill her if she 
tried to leave.88 She also told police that he was affiliated with a local street gang.89   
The police obtained a warrant to search the suspect’s home. The search warrant 
authorized two broad searches, one for “[a]ll handguns, rifles, or shotguns of any caliber, or any 
firearms capable of firing ammunition,” and the other for “[a]rticles of evidence showing street 
gang membership” despite the fact only one particular gun was used in the domestic dispute.90  
The Supreme Court focused on the second prong of the test for qualified immunity (no 
clearly established right), while skipping the first prong entirely (no right violated). The Court 
determined that the warrant in question was not plainly defective and the officers’ belief in its 
                                                 
81 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004). 
82 Id. at 195. 
83 Id. at 196. 
84 Id.  
85 Chemerinsky, supra note 50 at 7. 
86 Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1243 (2012).  
87 Id. at 1241. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id..  
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validity was reasonable.91 The Court came up with some odd explanations to justify the broad 
search.  
One of the more troubling characterizations was made during the analysis of the search 
for gang-related evidence. Despite the fact that the affidavit described the crime as “spousal 
assault and an assault with a deadly weapon,” the majority concluded that a reasonable officer 
could have viewed the suspect’s attack on his girlfriend as motivated not by the souring of his 
romantic relationship but by a desire to prevent her from disclosing details of his gang activity to 
the police.92 The Court further reasoned that “[s]he was, after all, no longer linked with him as a 
girlfriend; he had assaulted her in the past; and she had indeed called the cops on him.”93 Yet, no 
evidence supported this argument except for the fact that the suspect became angry after the 
victim called the police, which likely indicates that the suspect was upset his girlfriend reported 
his violence against her and that she slipped from his control, rather than that he feared exposure 
of his gang membership. The fact that the relationship ended should have been used to further 
the suit, as it “is likely that strong emotions still exist which can affect behavior, and in some 
cases resulting in a physical attack on that person.”94 The Court thus ignored the most obvious 
understanding of the suspect’s behavior in order to accept the government’s explanation. 
The Court’s reasoning suggests that the connection between the evidence and the crime 
can be speculative, entitling the police to search for anything that could potentially be related to a 
crime or could prove that some type of crime occurred. The warrant for gang-related evidence 
had no explanation of how gang-related items would provide evidence of the domestic assault 
the police were investigating. Probable cause requires more, but the focus of the Court was not 
on what the police did wrong. The Supreme Court instead echoed al-Kidd’s reasoning that 
officers are allowed to make “reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and concluded that “[t]he 
officers’ judgment that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause may have been 
mistaken, but it was not ‘plainly incompetent.”’95  
The Messerschmidt decision demonstrated that the Court will allow “reasonable” conduct 
by the police to be considered in qualified immunity cases rather than holding officers to the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that the search 
conducted in the case was the “kind of fishing expedition for evidence of unidentified criminal 
activity committed by unspecified persons [that] was the very evil the Fourth Amendment was 
intended to prevent.”96 She was concerned that the majority’s holding would encourage “sloppy 
police work” and “exacerbate the risk” of Fourth Amendment violations.97 Her concerns do not 
mention how the qualified immunity test was articulated in the opinion. Such a deferential view 
of what qualifies as reasonable conduct is not a part of the traditional qualified immunity 
analysis, but is obviously to be expected with al-Kidd as controlling precedent.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 Id. at 1246.  
92 Id. at 1247. 
93 Id. 
94 Kali Morris, Messerschmidt v. Millender: A Probable Cause Free-For-All, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 431, 446 (2012). 
95 Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249. 
96 Id. at 1256. 
97 Id. at 1260. 
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C. The Silencing of Protesters  
 
In Wood v. Moss, a group of protesters sued the Secret Service asserting that their First 
Amendment rights had been violated. In 2004, President George W. Bush was making a 
campaign appearance in Oregon when he made an unscheduled stop for dinner.98 His supporters 
were permitted to demonstrate within the President’s sight and hearing near the restaurant, but 
those who were protesting against him were moved two blocks away, far out of the President’s 
sight and hearing.99 The Secret Service said that relocating the protesters was a necessary 
measure to ensure that no demonstrator would be “within handgun or explosive range of the 
President.”100 The agents’ concern, however, did not extend to the guests already inside the 
restaurant where the President was dining, who were not required to leave, to stay clear of the 
patio, or to go through any security screening.101 As a result, the protesters alleged that the agents 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination when they moved the protesters away from the restaurant, 
while allowing only supporters to remain in their original location.102 
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court unanimously decided in favor of the Secret Service. 
Although the Court stated that the Secret Service agents were entitled to qualified immunity, the 
language it used to reach that conclusion was unorthodox. Strangely, before even engaging in the 
analysis, the opinion emphasized the enormous respect owed to the Secret Service due to the 
importance of its work: “[i]n other contexts, we have similarly recognized the Nation's ‘valid, 
even ... overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive.’”103 The Court 
then went on to say that they were mindful that “‘[o]fficers assigned to protect public officials 
must make singularly swift, on the spot, decisions whether the safety of the person they are 
guarding is in jeopardy.’”104  
The Court then proceeded to discuss qualified immunity. While the Court purported to 
resolve the case on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis (no clearly established 
right) rather than the first (no right violated), the analysis conflated the two prongs. Thus, most 
of the analysis asserted that there was no violation because the agents were motivated not by 
viewpoint discrimination, but by security concerns. A very limited discussion of case law 
ensued: “[n]o decision of which we are aware, however, would alert Secret Service agents 
engaged in crowd control that they bear a First Amendment obligation to ensure that groups with 
different viewpoints are at comparable locations at all times.”105 The rest of the opinion is spent 
not discussing precedent, but arguing that the agents were justified in moving the protesters 
based on the facts alleged by the Secret Service. The Court detailed the security risks that were 
purportedly present at the scene and concluded that the protesters could not “plausibly urge that 
the agents had no valid security reason to request or order the[ir] eviction.”106 Therefore, rather 
than analyzing whether the Secret Service agents should have known that their actions violated a 
                                                 
98 Wood v. Moss, 134 S.Ct. 2056, 2061 (2014). 
99 Id. at 2064. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 2065.  
103 Id. at 2067. 
104 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
105 Id. at 2068.  
106 Id. at 2069-70. 
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“clearly established right,” the Court appears to be saying that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently 
plead a violation of the Constitution.  
Contrary to the Court’s finding, the First Amendment was certainly violated here: “[t]he law 
under the First Amendment is clear that the government cannot discriminate among speakers 
based on their views unless strict scrutiny is met.”107 Yet Wood permits government officials to 
engage in viewpoint discrimination. As illustrated, protesters exercising their right to free speech 
can be shunted aside if there is even a whiff of “national security” interests implicated.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Qualified immunity was not designed to be of great assistance to plaintiffs suing the 
government. Accordingly, it is no surprise that the doctrine has blocked some civil rights cases 
from being fully heard. What is surprising is that in recent years the doctrine has blocked all 
Bivens suits.    
This evolution is not a product of the conservative majority of the Supreme Court. Important 
qualified immunity decisions post al-Kidd have been unanimous, showing that this is beyond 
partisan debate. Because of the Court’s new interpretation of qualified immunity, the government 
is now able to shoot with impunity while chasing a suspect, enter homes uninvited, and smother 
the voices of protesters. The Supreme Court has essentially turned its back on plaintiffs suing the 
government. 
The al-Kidd decision has meant that plaintiffs who would formerly file suit to find relief and 
justice now have to take their cases to the press and the public, as the Black Lives Matter 
movement has done. Bypassing attempts for legal redress, the Black Lives Matter movement 
uses the media to highlight systematic injustices inflicted by the police upon the African-
American community. The media now frequently calls attention to police shootings of African-
Americans and the lack of court response to these shootings. Public frustration with law 
enforcement and with the court has given rise to country-wide protests of the courts’ response, or 
lack thereof, evidencing the extent of the courts’ failure to provide a remedy.  
The Supreme Court confronts the most pressing issues in the country decisions should 
accurately and fairly decide the law while reflecting the values of the United States. Yet the 
Supreme Court continuously protects the government to the detriment of victims of its overreach. 
The Court must recognize that their qualified immunity analysis is both deeply flawed and unjust 
and that the actions of the government must be subject to more demanding scrutiny.  
The al-Kidd language cannot be undone, but the application of the new formulation of 
qualified immunity can change. The Court cannot continue to define the rights at issue so 
narrowly that no precedent can be examined nor can the Court refuse to acknowledge how their 
decisions lessen constitutional protections. Without a change, not only will the reputation of the 
judiciary continue to suffer, but civil rights law will remain stagnant. And most disturbing of all, 
the public will be denied access to justice.   
                                                 
107 Chemerinsky, supra note 50 at 7. Strict scrutiny requires that a government action be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990).  
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